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Abstract  
 The presented contribution attempts to introduce a phenomenological-
existential analysis of experiencing beauty (aesthetic experience) through 
Heidegger’s approach to the examination of state-of-mind. It points out a topic 
which no doubt extremely interested Heidegger, but which he did not approach 
by the method he offered in Being and Time. The text thus attempts to 
reconstruct what Heidegger’s answer to the question “what is beauty?” might 
have sounded like in this period of his work. The offered analysis respects the 
original structure of the question regarding the state-of-mind and examines 
beauty from three viewpoints: 1) what beautiful objects have in common and 
what characterises them, 2) what characterises aesthetic experience, and 
finally, 3) what matters to us in an aesthetic experience. Thus it attempts to 
interpret beauty within Heidegger’s understanding of being and being-in-the-
world before the “turn” in his thinking. The study points to the cognitive 
aspects of aesthetic experience in the sense of understanding beauty as the 
uncovering of being and the truth of the world. 
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Introduction 
 In this study we shall attempt to analyse the issue of beauty and 
aesthetic experience14 through a unique phenomenological approach, which 
was presented by Martin Heidegger in his Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) in 
the hope that this approach may prove to be beneficial not only for the 
philosophical study of beauty, but also for other disciplines dealing with 
beauty, or even for philosophers – non-specialists – dealing with other issues 
and disciplines of philosophy. 
                                                          
14 Despite the thematic multidimensionality of aesthetic experience, containing a great many 
more aspects than just beauty, for the purposes of this study (due to methodological reasons) 
I shall limit myself to the identification of beauty with the content of the aesthetic experience. 
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 As we know, Heidegger held a rather critical attitude towards classical 
aesthetics (Scottish, Baumgarten, Kant),15 rejecting its contemporary 
subjectivism and subject-object split (Thomson 2017). Instead, and in the 
place of the analysis of subjective feelings, he proposed a return back to the 
phenomenology of art (of the artwork itself), which he documented, especially 
in his 1935/1936 lectures entitled Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,16 as well as 
in numerous later works, in which he kept coming back to the topic of beauty, 
truth and art.17 Although the work Being and Time originated much earlier 
(1927) with the purpose of introducing the structure and fundamental role of 
phenomenological thinking and deals very little with the question of beauty or 
aesthetics, I still believe that for the correct understanding of Heidegger’s 
approach to beauty and art, the key for the perception of beauty as an 
existential uncoveredness may be sought, in particular, in this early and most 
academic of his treatise – in Being and Time. 
 In this work Heidegger applied a phenomenological-hermeneutic-
existentialist way of thinking to the analysis of completely different 
phenomena – fear (Section 30) and anxiety (Section 40). However, it seems, 
its use may be applied to almost all existential states-of-mind. Aesthetic 
experience is doubtlessly one of them. Especially if the point of departure for 
its study is not some kind of objective analysis of the properties and qualities 
of objects themselves as physical objects - an analysis and description of how 
beautiful the objects are, as objects, in their formal or material structure in the 
form of some Pythagorean aesthetics of ratios. Or, on the other hand, the study 
of the processes that accompany the origination and progress of aesthetic 
experience in the brain and the CNS (neuroaesthetics), but rather on the 
contrary, a first-person description of aesthetic experience and that means 
what we experience and how we experience it; what our experience uncovers 
for us. 
                                                          
15 According to Ian Thomson, Heidegger’s attitude to aesthetics may be described as anti-
aesthetism and is best expressed by Barnet Newman’s statement that “Aesthetics is for the 
artist as ornithology is for the birds” (Thomson 2017) 
16 The lecture was first given on 13 November 1935 at the Kunstwissenschaftliche 
Gesellschaft in Freiburg, then in January 1936 in Zürich, and as a lecture cycle in the same 
year (17 Nov, 24 Nov, 4 Dec) also in Frankfurt am Main. 
17 As is known, Heidegger wrote several works on the topic of beauty and art: Wozu Dichter? 
(1946), »...dichterisch wohnet der Mensch...« (1951), Die Kunst und der Raum (1969) and 
lectures: e.g. on Hölderlin and his poetic work, or Über die Bestimmung der Künste im 
gegenwärtigen Weltalter (Baden-Baden Haus Schweizer 7.–8. Mai 1959), Bemerkungen zu 
Kunst – Plastik – Raum (St. Gallen 3. Oktober 1964), Die Herkunft der Kunst und die 
Bestimmung des Denkens (Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste in Athen 4. April 1967) 
and even his last official lecture (Die Frage nach der Bestimmung der Kunst, which he gave 
on 9 April 1970 in München) was dedicated to the issue of art. 
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 Heidegger’s philosophical thoughts were based on his analysis of 
everydayness and of how we understand ourselves and the world in 
everydayness. That is why in the course of his research he especially focused 
on moods and the phenomenon of “being-attuned” (especially fear) and the 
description of the inner experience and understanding of things in the world 
and ourselves in our moods. In his approach he preferred a scheme that was 
distinguished by three questions: 1) what all “fearful” things have in common, 
2) what our fear shows us, and 3) what really matters to us in our fear or 
anxiety. And that the same scheme (as I believe) may also be used for aesthetic 
experience. 
 It is an indubitable fact that objects of taste and liking represent a wide 
and unstable range of the most diverse objects. Hence there is probably no 
sense in looking for any common physical characteristics in these objects but 
rather in focusing on one of their key characteristics as aesthetic objects, that 
undoubtedly being their ability to evoke a feeling of liking. 
 What the objects we assess as beautiful have in common is their ability 
to produce a fancy – pleasant feeling caused by our perception of these objects, 
regardless of their formal, material or other aspects. It seems that despite their 
variety almost all of them produce the same or a very similar state, that being 
the feeling of fancy. 
 This piece of information sounds too banal when heard for the first 
time for it to be philosophically studied in more depth. The ability of 
“beautiful” objects to evoke a feeling of liking, however, is not self-evident at 
all. We may wonder whether beauty is an objective quality of things (beauty 
as a property of the object itself – Thomas Reid) or on the contrary – if it is 
the product of the observer (Beauty is in the eye of the beholder -see Démuth 
2016), but also whether and in what manner various things evoke aesthetic 
experience. At times we immediately consider the object of fancy as beautiful 
and do not have to particularly focus on it. At other times we need it to be 
pointed out to us, or we only notice its beauty after repeated observation, after 
further experience, after education or simply when in a different state-of-mind. 
What then causes one thing (phenomenon, event) to appeal to us as beautiful 
while another does not? 
 In the way of Heidegger we could wonder about a certain quality of 
the thing itself. However, it is not its physical ability or quality, but rather the 
ability of its phenomenal action. “Beautiful” things must have perceivable 
beauty at their disposal, they must seem, present themselves in a form which 
is capable of being liked. In this respect it does not matter whether this 
“beautiful form” of appearance belongs to the nature of something and its 
uncoveredness, or whether it is its appearance or even a deceptive semblance 
Heidegger 2001, 51). In order for something to seem to be beautiful, it has to 
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have the mentioned ability to evoke such an impression. However, that in itself 
is certainly not enough. 
 Beautiful objects do not only possess their own beautiful phenomenal 
structure; in addition to that they also have to be capable of affecting us with 
it – of touching us with its (real or apparent) beauty. In order for them to touch 
us in this way, we have to be located in the operational range of the object. 
When we find ourselves in the vicinity of a beautiful object we do not always, 
realise its beauty. Its beauty may be covered from our eyes, hidden by 
something – physically or intellectually. Physically, for example, if it is in the 
“shadow” of another object or phenomenon which makes it impossible for it 
to affect us. Intellectually if it presupposes a certain revelation and 
understanding. 
 But even when the object does not presuppose such a pre-
understanding, it may still not touch us in a way. That is because its aesthetic 
effect on us is not strong enough, or it is too distant and does not affect us 
with sufficient intensity. In no case is this, however, a matter of physical or 
geometrical proximity and distance. Beautiful things do not have to be close, 
we may like distant countries or objects which are physically distant, but are 
still close to us in a different sense: they are an object of our thoughts, 
imagination and feelings. We carry them within us in the form of a memory 
or a creative imagination – they dwell in the land of our ideas, and therefore 
are (with) us. They are near because we are aware of them, they are near 
because we perceive and feel their effect. They are literally as near as they can 
be – they stand as though they are immediately in front of us (and may even 
be inside us – as feelings in our receptors and our cortex; opposite us and 
before us as images – Gegenstand – Vorstellung – in our minds). Thus they 
are close enough to touch us and we can touch them with our consciousness 
(sight, touch). Not only somewhere at a mental distance (in a bygone and 
forgotten past) but on the contrary – right now. If the memory does not affect 
us, it may already be too distant. Beautiful images work only when they are 
perceived as current. In this sense we may wonder about the need to find 
ourselves in the current operational range of the beautiful phenomenon. 
 The effect of beautiful things, however, is not a bodily, physical 
process. Beautiful things do not automatically attract us in the same way as 
gravitation or magnetism affects our bodies. Heidegger rather speaks about 
radiation and emanation (Biemel 1995, 121). The effect of beautiful things is 
nevertheless a certain form of gravitation – it is attraction. Their attraction 
focuses on our consciousness – our attention. Beautiful things, like ugly 
things, draw our attention. They affect the mind and our feelings in such a way 
that they often capture them. Thus if we thus perceive a truly beautiful object, 
it often happens that it attracts our attention in the same way as the gaze of the 
mythical Medusa. Beauty can take our breath away (alter its frequency as well 
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as affect other bodily functions), it can paralyse the body and totally change 
the future. Just as terror or ugliness can often paralyse the body and do not 
permit the mind to avert our gaze or attention away from their source, in the 
same way beauty draws our attention and urges us to notice and examine it in 
more detail (Kawabata, Zeki 2004). Due to its value we cannot turn away from 
it and we want to perceive it with as much attention as possible. If nothing else 
forces us to act otherwise, we dedicate ourselves to it, we contemplate it, we 
attempt to remain in its proximity, we expose ourselves to its influence. If (for 
any reason) it is not physically possible, at least we indulge ourselves in its 
effects in our imagination. 
 The reason why we do this is rooted in the pleasant feeling that 
beautiful objects evoke. Simply, we like beauty and we like to like it. For many 
aestheticians beauty is essentially connected with pleasantness and fancy. And 
“pleasantness” and fancy make us yearn for greater fulfilment. 
 Beautiful things affect us with their exceptional qualities and they thus 
fulfil us and enrich us in a certain way. This (intellectual) enrichment is based 
on a new experience and the emotional enrichment of the (repeated) derivation 
of the experience of the perception of it. That may be the reason that we 
surround ourselves with beautiful things, why we want to be in their proximity 
and why we yearn for them. That is why beauty is so often connected with 
lust, jealousy or envy – with a possessive approach towards objects of fancy. 
 The essence of enrichment and fulfilment is the future and its drawing 
close. “This drawing-close is within what is close by” (Heidegger 2001, 180). 
We often yearn for beauty in direct proportion to the proximity of it in which 
we find ourselves. Its attraction increases with the ratio of its possible 
fulfilment; however, if from being close it draws near to such an extent that it 
is already here and not in the future (the moment of fulfilment), its attraction 
suddenly disappears (Kierkegaard). Thus, if we are exposed to the effect of 
nice things, or their variability, in the long term, after an intense perception, 
after a certain time we are no longer capable of absorbing any more of the 
effects of the beautiful objects. They cease to affect us and it is even possible 
for us to temporarily or permanently become satiated. At that moment they 
have nothing more to give us. 
 Beautiful things can affect us with their beauty only from a closeness 
that draws closer, which evokes the liking that we like. 
 The pleasant feelings which beautiful things evoke in us draw our 
attention to the aesthetic experience itself. It seems that aesthetic experience 
may be perceived as a certain form of understanding of things and ourselves. 
Understanding things in the sense that during a disinterested aesthetic 
experience we behold within the objects their distinctive aesthetic qualities. In 
other states-of-mind we do not perceive these qualities, that is we are not 
aware of them or are not sensitive to them. 
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 Heidegger analyses this phenomenon with the example of fear. When 
we are afraid of fire, we perceive its threat and are incapable of seeing the 
usefulness or beauty of the flames. Similarly during a normal experience with 
a knife, we behold its ability to cut bread or spread butter but not the danger it 
presents. We only see that when somebody takes it in their hand and we realise 
that it may serve as a powerful weapon. And that not only during real 
Hitchcockian movements, but especially in our imagination using the 
mechanisms of Bayesian probability. 
 One of the characteristic features of the Heidegger approach is the 
conviction that various moods make the world accessible in various ways. To 
express this, Heidegger uses the spatial metaphor of finding oneself in a state-
of-mind (die Befindlichkeit), as well as the acoustic metaphor of being-attuned 
(Stimmungen - see Démuth 2011). A state-of-mind is a spatial determinant 
which enables us to see things from a certain aspect – perspective. At the same 
time, however, it also necessarily hides certain aspects of things. That is why, 
if we are afraid, we cannot see the beauty of the world, its utility or amusing 
qualities. On the contrary, when feeling elated joy we do not perceive threats 
or the tragedy of the situation. Heidegger believed that moods function as 
certain lenses which unlock the world in a particular manner. Every lens does 
that in its own unique way and only by using more perspectives and with their 
combination is it possible to arrive at an objective and complex understanding. 
 Aesthetic experience makes the aesthetic qualities and values of things 
accessible. That is exactly what we focus on when we perceive beauty. If we 
like something it is because it can especially register with those aspects of 
things which are worthy of fancy. That means that we understand things in 
a certain way. We perceive their form, structure, quality, ignoring their 
purpose, origin, price or real existence. Whereas in fear we notice threat and 
the potential harmfulness of things, on the contrary, with beauty, we feel 
nothing like that. We feel the excellent elaboration, exceptional rendering, 
unique rarity, perfection or, simply, harmony of forms and structures. 
 The source of this understanding of things undoubtedly comes from 
these phenomena themselves. That is the main premise of phenomenology. 
Beautiful things simply appeal to us (similar to an attack of fear). The essence 
of feeling beauty is thus its appearance. And the art of the aesthete is the ability 
to see beauty where it occurs. With this, however, we arrive at a serious 
problem: Is beauty something that lies in the essence of the appearance of 
beautiful things or is it a matter of our beholding? 
 One of the fundamental features of Heidegger phenomenology is the 
conviction that we can only arrive at reality through the uncovering of the 
pristine essence of the phenomenon. Only the phenomenon, that is the fact that 
something is mediated for us in any way at all, makes it possible for us to 
perceive it as beautiful, ugly, true or false. It is clear that superficial and non-
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authentic forms of appearance may present something as beautiful although it 
is not in reality (it is only glitz, a semblance) and on the contrary, some things 
are only beautiful under the surface, once we penetrate towards their deeper 
and more archetypal structures. Phenomenology then may be, in the sense of 
Section 7 of Being and Time, understood as art, “to let that which shows itself 
be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” 
(Heidegger 2001, 58), or as the art of uncovering reality in such a way as for 
us to behold it in its uncoveredness and unconcealedness – that is, as the art of 
seeing things in a certain particular way and to understand them on the basis 
of themselves. 
 In Heidegger’s idea of state-of-mind it seems, however, that our 
understanding of the qualities of things draws also from a previous experience 
or pre-understanding. Only in such a way is it possible to explain that, on the 
basis of the experienced or familiarity, somebody sees danger where 
somebody else no longer sees it (or not yet). Children are not afraid of many 
things that may harm them and, on the contrary, in adulthood we are often not 
terrified of that which we found “fearful” in childhood. That is also valid for 
beauty. Some objects of art or scenery are so fascinating that they appeal to 
almost everyone and pull us out of our everyday practical interests. Others do 
not possess such an immediate expressive value so readily obvious at first 
sight: to see beauty it is often necessary (as for any other forms of visual 
phenomena) to learn. Somebody sees beauty where another does not – they 
may be sensitive to nuances and aspects which are hidden from the eyes of 
another. Others, due to their own pains or interests, may not perceive values 
which they have right in front of them and which surround them. However, 
regardless of the need for experience or the beholding of pure phenomena: 
beholding or feeling is in any case a form of understanding. Feeling, being-
attuned and emotions thus have a certain precognitive function. 
 Heidegger, however, was not inclined towards the epistemic-
instrumentalistic role of beauty or art. Beautiful objects (and especially not 
works of art) are not here to mediate something. They are not intended to 
represent anything and substitute for something that is hidden behind them. 
They are not a replacement of facts, but quite the opposite: they are the very 
fact itself. If we perceive something as beautiful, it is because the beauty of 
the phenomenon absorbs us. That which is beautiful is beautiful in itself. It 
shows its own essence. Beautiful things and artwork are in Heidegger’s 
opinion beautiful because they are true in the sense of their true experience. 
They show themselves, not the stories behind them. A theatre play or a fairy-
tale by the Grimm brothers is beautiful if it gives us a deep experience, if we 
get lost in it, and not because it is an allusion to some true story. Similarly the 
beauty of a flower or nature is not an imitation of something, but an 
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uncovering of reality itself. It is namely in this connection that the relationship 
of beauty with uncoveredness as aletheia is rooted. 
 In his work The Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger solved the 
dilemma of objectivity and subjectivity of beauty unequivocally to the benefit 
of antisubjectivism. “Beauty is one way in which truth essentially occurs as 
unconcealment” (Heidegger 1993, 181). “The beautiful is not explained in 
terms of subjective experience, of how the work affects the subject, but in 
terms of the openness showing that becomes manifest in a work of art, from 
the basic phenomenon of uncoveredness” (Biemel 1995, 121). Nevertheless, 
it is namely the individual experiencing which characterises aesthetic 
experience. 
 The essence of aesthetic experience (similar to any other) is its 
experiencing. Whereas in fear we experience the horrifying uncanniness of the 
place where danger lurks, which we want to avoid by any means, and due to 
the impossibility of the identification of this danger, in our anxiety, we cannot 
even find a safe place to escape from it, in aesthetic experience we usually 
experience the contrary. The feeling of beauty produces changes in bodily 
functions: a quickening of the pulse, a change in breathing, a widening of the 
pupils, etc. The experience of beauty is a physiological, bodily experience – a 
somatic marker which is accompanied by a number of objectively measurable 
manifestations. The experience of beauty is, however, characterised especially 
by its subjectively experienced content – pleasure, a feeling of the pleasant 
and our effort to remain with it. While for Heidegger anxiety is a land of 
“uncanniness” (Heidegger 2001, 234), beauty is the exact opposite. It is the 
Promised Land – a place where we enjoy remaining in our mind, it is 
something we contemplate, or something we tend towards, where (with which) 
we want to stay. That is why we surround ourselves with beautiful things, we 
decorate our homes or escape to real or imaginary lands which produce in us 
feelings that are good, safe and pleasant – to lands where we do not feel the 
excruciating uncanniness of being and where the world and we are better than 
we (it) really are (is). A typical sign of beauty is its potential “liveability”, that 
is not an intimate and total familiarity that arises from the already lived-in but 
a certain novelty related to the feeling of suitable living-in. When beholding 
beauty we do not feel an urge to run away from but rather to stay and savour, 
admire and examine, or an (sometimes passionate) urge to come close (run 
towards) in order to more intensively behold beauty down to its utmost detail. 
 The feeling of a possible home is also related to the need for time and 
safety that we require for the contemplation of beautiful objects. Unlike the 
vision of threat and danger, beauty lets us forget the potential risks or expects 
their absence. Beauty abounds in the feeling of safety and sufficiency of time 
(or at least demands them), that is what Aristotle would call θεωςία – 
beholding. This is what we go to galleries for, or why we open books and listen 
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to music without any other intention or need which would limit and disturb us. 
Frequent looking and contemplation which are a requirement for the 
examination of things – without any other subsidiary intentions and interests, 
except the thing itself – are characteristic demands of aesthetic experience. 
However, this disinterested beholding, sufficiently thorough and liberated 
from any other intention, is not only about beholding a thing and “gaining” 
information from it. That which is beautiful about it (and what distinguishes it 
from the theoretical scientific getting-to-know) is that the contemplation and 
looking itself fills us with beauty and a pleasant experience. So pleasant that 
we often want to share it. 
 Anxiety makes one lonely and forces us to face the factuality of being. 
With beauty, although we do behold it on our own, we like to share our 
experience thereof, and especially with those who most belong to our being. 
The feeling of beauty is one of expansive feelings, that makes us feel that we 
are fulfilled by something, frequently to such an extent that the impossibility 
of sharing this feeling may impoverish the quality of the experience. The 
feeling of beauty or beauty which cannot be shared is not complete. That is 
why we often talk about their sources, it is due to this in particular that we 
enjoy sharing these feelings. 
 When Heidegger speaks about the states-of-mind and feelings as 
understanding he does not mean only the understanding of things themselves. 
Aesthetic experience does not only tell us about the qualities of things; it tells 
us even more about ourselves. It uncovers what we inclined towards, what we 
long for or what we need, and especially what we like. Maybe that is the 
essence of subjectivistically oriented aesthetics – understanding beauty as an 
understanding of oneself, one’s feelings, preferences and needs. 
 That which we like speaks often more about the subject than about the 
object of the aesthetic assessment. And that not only in the sense of uncovering 
the “objectivity” of the individual aesthetic statement. In the case of beauty it 
is the reflection of one’s subjectivity in the direct onthological sense. 
 Feeling may generally be considered as uncovering one’s body or mind 
– to oneself (A. Damasio), doing it through that which we ourselves are not 
(through things which afflict our senses). For Kant the feeling of liking is 
essentially connected with the reflection of our own feelings and states. Beauty 
thus results from the reflection of the effect an object of sensuality has on us. 
The feeling of liking or not-liking is thus basically understanding ourselves. 
 Heidegger, however, points out the deeper meaning of self-
understanding for any understanding of the world and things in it. He believes 
that only on the basis of understanding ourselves is it at all possible for things 
to touch us in any semantic way. If we for example did not understand 
ourselves as temporarily final and such as may be harmed, it would not be 
possible for us to be afraid at all. Only thanks to the reflection of oneself (one’s 
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own needs and desires) is it then possible to understand things in the world in 
given contexts (as harmful, dangerous, useful ...). And logically only 
understanding ourselves and our own values and needs allows us to also 
perceive beauty – that is, whether we like something or not. If we had no needs 
and desires, if we did not have their reflection, we could not even feel that 
something saturates us or does not saturate us with the feeling of fancy and 
satisfaction. Liking – self-reflection – is thus primarily uncovering the 
understanding of oneself. 
 From Section 40 of Being and Time it follows that what matters to 
anxiety is its being – to be able to be. It is in particular being and its qualities 
that also matter to us in the experience of beauty. 
 Aesthetic experience itself is characterised by pulling us out of a non-
authentic existence. Beauty is not a common experience. It is something 
unique – ecstatic, in a certain sense. 
 If we are confronted with a beautiful object, it evokes in us not only 
interest and attention but also the desire or awareness of its value. In this way 
we transcend the thing and touch something that does not lie only it its form. 
We touch the being itself. The content of this experience may often be likened 
to a religious or mystical experience with several of its displays. 
 On the simplest level – we aspire to beautiful things, we want to be in 
their proximity, and we want to contemplate them. We are aware of their 
qualities, rarity and value. That is why we often spend a great deal of energy 
and means in order to be able to spend as much time as possible with them, or 
even to affect ourselves and others with their qualities. The desire to affect 
others with beautiful things or appearances is a proof that we realise their value 
and assume that our own value (attractiveness) increases in the eyes of others 
(Schiller 1992). Nevertheless, aspiring for beauty for others’ sakes is 
hypocritical and unsatisfactory by definition because it does not deal with the 
true values of the being itself but only their appearance. 
 As far as we yearn for beauty for our own pleasure, we long for 
beautiful objects and forms because we want them to belong to us and for us 
to be able to take pleasure in them at any time. Such a possessive 
understanding of beauty reveals that we realise the value of beauty itself, but 
the object of beauty is not the same as our being; it is the being of something 
else (which we want to behold). That is true even when the object of beauty is 
for instance our own body or our creation. Surrounding ourselves with 
beautiful things in order to look at them, however, tells us that what really 
matters to us is not even their possession but the option to behold them as 
much as possible. 
 The attractiveness and value of beautiful things evokes enthusiasm in 
us, frequently even obsession and lust. Their importance is so great that other 
phenomena (almost) fade next to them, ceding to the background, and we only 
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perceive their value. There are a number of objects we cannot and do not want 
to possess (a starry sky, a landscape, the blush of dawn ...). Their beauty lies 
in their ungraspable existence. And that, even when we realise that the greatest 
aesthetic (and existential) value comes from our own experiencing of beauty 
(Goethe’s Verweile doch, du bist so schön!). It is namely in the experiencing 
of beauty and beautiful moments that we contemplate the value of being itself. 
Whether it is the being of a beautiful object or “merely” our own experiencing 
of this experience. 
 Naturally, at the same time, we respect, care for and protect beautiful 
things. We perceive that which is beautiful as valuable and worthy of care. We 
tend to protect beautiful things and not only when we own them. It is often 
beauty that prevents us from harming or destroying things, it is beauty that 
fills us with a certain respect and awe. And maybe here we are at the core of 
the issue. 
 We perceive beautiful things as more valuable than non-beautiful ones. 
Their beauty is an expression of the qualities of their being. That is why beauty 
uncovers being. It draws our attention to it. Not only to the being of things but, 
again in the Heidegger spirit: it points out to us our own being and its quality. 
In the same way as without knowledge of the temporality of being-in-the-
world (Dasein) it would not be possible to understand things as harmful, and 
without a limited horizon of being our actions would not have meaning due to 
their possible revocability, thus without an understanding of the value of the 
being itself it is not possible to assess the qualities of the being of other things. 
Beautiful things are valuable but only because they improve or emphasise the 
quality of our own being-in-the-world. Thus they represent the value of being, 
either of being-in-the-world or of the world itself. And it is in beauty that we 
transcend being itself. 
 It can be argued that beauty is beauty per se and its instrumental 
understanding is incorrect. The abovementioned understanding does not 
subjectivise or instrumentalise beauty as a cognitive instrument for grasping 
being, although it is undoubtedly unawaredly that. Heidegger considers beauty 
as one of the means of how the truth about being reveals itself. It is a way of 
that being steps out of hiding, how it is possible to become aware of it. The 
purpose of beauty (if we can even contemplate a purpose), and especially then 
the role of art, which is supposed to produce beauty, is the manifestation of 
being and the world and even in such a way that the individual historical or 
cultural forms of art may be understood as specific articulations of the cultural 
understanding of being (Dreyfus 2005). That is, however, another question – 
a question of Heidegger’s understanding of the essence and role of art. 
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Summary 
 Aesthetic experience and the perception of beauty represents, for 
several philosophers, one of the classical existentials in which it is possible to 
see and feel the value of being. The presented contribution has attempted to 
draw attention to beauty through Heidegger’s structure of the issue of state-
of-mind. It thus points out a topic in which Heidegger was no doubt extremely 
interested, but which he did not approach using the method he offered in his 
Being and Time. Using his approach the text offers a possible wording of a 
Heideggerian answer to the questions: 1) what beautiful things have in 
common, 2) what characterises an aesthetic experience, and at the same time 
and especially, 3) what is uncovered for us in the experiencing of beauty. And 
as experts already knew, the answer lies in the unity of beauty and aletheia and 
in the unique (and pleasantly experienced, unlike anxiety or worry) mediation 
of uncoveredness and the sense of being. Because beauty uncovers being and 
in particular uncovers its value. 
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